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THE SOVIET ESPIONAGE APPARATUS

Mr. DODD. The skill and pervasiveness and the ability of the Soviet espionage apparatus to penetrate free world governments at the highest level has again been dramatically illustrated by the case of Harold "Kim" Philby, for many years head of British anti-Soviet intelligence, who has recently let it be known from his Moscow sanctuary that he served as a Soviet agent for more than 30 years.

Philby held a number of diplomatic posts, which enabled him to disclose to Moscow top secret information involving both British and American security. At the time of his defection, as a recent article in the Washington Daily News points out, he was being groomed to head up M-16, as the British counter intelligence service is known, in which capacity he would have been Britain's chief link with the CIA.

Philby enjoyed the confidence of every senior official of the British Government from the Prime Minister down. The Daily News article points out that when in 1955 it named Philby for the first time "as the man who had tipped off British turncoats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean, enabling them to flee to Russia," no less a person than Foreign Secretary Harold MacMillan came to the defense of Philby, who was at that time serving as First Secretary of the British Embassy in Washington.

As shocking as the case of Philby may be, we in this country are in no position to point an accusing finger at the British. Indeed, if we recall our recent past, there is probably no country in the Western World where more men holding top Government positions have been exposed—but only after many years—as Soviet agents. Among those thus exposed were:

Alger Hiss, who was in charge of the International Organizations Division of the Department of State, and who was a prime architect of the Yalta agreement and of the United Nations Charter.

Harry Dexter White, who as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in effect ran the American Treasury and used his position to give the Treasury Department an influence in the conduct of foreign affairs which it had never before possessed.

Frank Coe, a onetime assistant of Harry Dexter White, who later became President of the World Bank, with American approval, and then was obliged to resign when he invoked the fifth amendment in response to the question: "Are you a Soviet agent, Mr. Coe?" Mr. Coe is now working for Red China.

Larry Duggan, onetime head of Latin American Division of the Department of State, who was pushed or jumped from a New York skyscraper window on the eve of his scheduled testimony before a Senate committee.

These were among the best known and the most highly placed of the Soviet agents uncovered as a result of revelations made during the late forties and early fifties. But there were scores of others who held lesser rank but whose capacity for mischief and for the perversion of our foreign policy was almost as great.

The Soviet espionage apparatus is without question the most massive that has ever existed in history. It is also the most professional and the most diversified and the most successful in mounting high-level infiltration in other governments. This confronts us with a situation where the old adage that "eternal vigilance is the price of freedom" applies with tenfold truth.

The Philby experience in Britain, the Colonel Wennerstrom experience in Sweden and our own experience in this country all point to the need for the most stringent security procedures in government employment. Among other things they point to the need for periodically conducted security reviews of all those who hold sensitive government posts—even those at very high levels.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the article entitled "Philby Admits Spying for Reds," published in the October 2, 1967, edition of the New York Daily News.

In this connection, I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the text of an article entitled "Foreign Affairs: Where the Spies Are," written by C. L. Sulzberger, and published in the New York Times of September 13, 1967.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Daily News, Oct 2, 1967]

PHILBY ADMITS SPYING FOR REDS

(By Henry Maule)

LONDON, October 1.—Twelve years after British diplomat Harold A. R. (Kim) Philby was exposed in THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS as the "third man" in a spy case, he has admitted being a Soviet agent for more than 30 years.

An exclusive dispatch from this correspondent to THE NEWS in 1955 named Philby for the first time as the man who had tipped off British turncoats Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean, enabling them to flee to Russia.

The question was raised in Parliament and Harold Macmillan, then foreign secretary, cleared Philby, former first secretary of the British Embassy in Washington, declaring there was "no reason to conclude that Mr. Philby has at any time betrayed the interests of this country or to identify him with a so-called third man."

"I HAVE COME HOME," HE TELLS SON

Philby, 65, has admitted to his oldest son, John, 24, who recently visited him in Moscow, that his allegiance has been to the Soviet Union most of his adult life.

"I have come home," he told the son, declaring himself completely happy in Moscow, where he ostensibly works for a Soviet publishing house.

Two London newspapers, the Observer and Sunday Times, carried today what the Observer called his "unmatched success story in espionage."

They reported that Philby was now known to be the most important spy the Russians had in the West, and that in the last decade, while serving as a Soviet agent, he

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was a trusted senior officer at the heart of British intelligence.

Philby reportedly was assigned by the Russians in 1934 to infiltrate British intelligence. By 1944 he was appointed head of the British anti-Soviet intelligence.

IN ON BRITISH AND U.S. SECRETS

He was named to diplomatic posts from which he was able to disclose to Moscow the inner secrets of M-16, Britain's counterintelligence service, and of American Central Intelligence Agency, the newspapers said. He was being groomed to head M-16 and be Britain's link with the CIA.

In 1951, Philby risked exposing his position by warning MacLean that he had just been unmasked as a major atomic spy, permitting MacLean to flee with his friend Burgess, who since has died.

Apparently Philby did so because he suspected MacLean and Burgess might break down under interrogation and betray him.

Philby was later exposed by a Soviet intelligence officer who defected to the West in 1961 and told London about him. Philby fled to Moscow in 1963 from Beirut, Lebanon, where he was working for the Observer and, that paper said, for British intelligence.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 13, 1967]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: WHERE THE SPIES ARE (By C. L. Sulzberger)

The cold war between tightly knit Soviet and NATO blocs has certainly relaxed. The five years since the Cuban missile showdown have been marked by cautious if persistent efforts to improve relations between Washington and Moscow despite tensions in Vietnam and the Middle East. Loosening of their own alliances, realization of the folly of nuclear war and mutual fear of China have all contributed to this easement.

But this trend should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the two superpowers continue to found policy on each other's assumed intentions and to watch each other's every move. All the time, day and night, Soviet and American spy satellites whizz overhead while their photographic eavesdropping and other electronic devices snoop about the globe.

EXPOSED NETWORKS

Nor has the subsidence of tension reduced conventional espionage. We are only occasionally reminded of this fact by events such as South Africa's recent seizure of a Russian spy named Yuri Loginov or the exposure of a clandestine Soviet network last March when Giorgio Rinaldi was arrested by Italian military intelligence.

Between March 1963 and April 1967 no fewer than 107 Soviet intelligence officers were uncovered around the world. Most of them held diplomatic passports and were simply declared *persona non grata* and sent home.

Loginov has already made a full confession which involves many Russian so-called diplomats. They include Konstantin Frolov who worked in Argentina and Australia; Yuri Budin (also called Modin, former Soviet counselor in New Delhi; Vitali Pavlov (alias Petrov), a counselor of embassy in Western Europe, who was in Ottawa during the Gouzenko spy case; Aleksei Tiblayshin, who once worked at UNESCO in Paris; Yuri Chekulav, a diplomat in the Middle East; and Boris Skoridov said to be the same as Boris Gouzenko, member of Moscow's London embassy.

The highly proficient Soviet espionage apparatus of G.R.U. (military intelligence) and K.G.B. (interior ministry) makes wide use of diplomatic, journalistic and commercial cover. The G.R.U. officer arrested in the Rinaldi case, Yuri Pavlenko, was an attaché at the Rome embassy. Rinaldi exposed Albert Gouzenko, embassy secretary in Athens; Boris Pavlenko, attaché in Nicosia; Nikolai Ranov, Aeroflot airlines representative in Cyprus;

Igor Oshurkov, trade representative in Greece; Mikhail Badin, Vienna military attaché; Georgi Balan, military attaché in Italy, then Mexico; Aleksei Solovov, employee in the Rome military attaché's office.

Experts assume no Soviet diplomatic establishment draws fewer than half its staff from G.R.U. or K.G.B. rosters, a figure rising to 80 per cent in some embassies. Of 107 Russian spies exposed last year, 45 had diplomatic cover; thirty were listed as journalists; fifteen commercial representatives; five Aeroflot; six "cultural" representatives.

A vitally important, if more conventional, Soviet espionage network at Bakfjord, northern Norway, did effective work in the NATO area before Norwegian counterintelligence broke it up. This group's agents, trained in Murmansk, were responsible for entrapment of the famous U-2 plane piloted by Gary Powers in 1960. This was shot down over Russia while on a high-flying reconnaissance mission between Pakistan and Norway.

A NEW SUPERSPY

Allied officials are now perplexed by the appearance on the West European scene of a new type of superspy assigned to political action and reporting directly to the Soviet Communist party's International Section, an echelon above K.G.B. and G.R.U. Four diplomats believed to hold such assignments are Sergei Kudryavtsev, Minister-Counselor in Bonn; Pavel Medvedovsky, Counselor in Rome; and Vladimir Feodorov and Georgi Farafanov, Counselors in Helsinki.

Kudryavtsev also involved in Canada's Gouzenko case, was Russia's first Ambassador to Castro. He supervised installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Medvedovsky worked in the K.G.B. before being promoted to his political action job. Feodorov, once deputy chief of the party's International Section, was a political observer in China. Farafanov worked in Stockholm eight years for the K.G.B.

THE WAR GOES ON

One cannot predict how many new names will be added to this roster as a result of Loginov's confession in South Africa, a confession that has already connected five continents in the extraordinary Soviet network. The basic point is that despite the relative thaw between Moscow and Washington, and efforts to work out political and economic accommodation, the spy war goes on.

The watch persists in the skies, on the high seas where trawlers and submarines carry complex electronic devices; along endless frontiers from Norway to Kamchatka; and in the susurrous cellars of embassies about the world. The overt cold war has eased—but not its covert counterpart.